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#### The House will pass a clean debt ceiling

National Review Online 9/19/13 ("The Corner, Lowry: House Will Pass Clean Debt Limit Raise")

The effort to use the debt ceiling as leverage to defund Obamacare will come to naught, National Review editor Rich Lowry said tonight.¶ During an appearance on Special Report’s All-Star Panel, Lowry predicted that the House would eventually pass a “clean” debt limit raise despite drama in the Senate related to the effort to defund Obamacare.¶ “It goes to the Senate, there’ll be some theatrics, Harry Reid will strip out the defunding from the [continuing resolution], it’ll go back to the House and probably end up passed in a clean version,” Lowry said.

#### Plan spends political capital

CCFPD 98 (“The future of Nuclear Arms Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy”) <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/E2-351-1998E.pdf>

Even though the agenda is full and opinion diverse, the "no first use" discussion is seen by many as a useful vehicle to open up debate within NATO. For the upcoming NATO review, Ambassador Tom Graham stated, "NATO should downplay the significance of nuclear weapons and commit to no-first-use policy....emerging documents should not contain language reflecting the status of nuclear weapons as the most important weapon that NATO possesses, that it is essential to peace or that it is the ultimate guarantee to NATO's security..... These steps would strengthen the the NPT and reduce the risk of proliferation." (Ottawa roundtable) The current language of NATO maintains political status of nuclear weapons, particularly the right of first-use. This political value of nuclear arms must be reduced. It was also stated that a global no-first use should be put in the existing context to include proliferators in Asia (India, Pakistan, Korea). David Haglund expressed another view, "Why rock the boat when NATO is adapting well to a new security landscape/doctrine?" If the end-game of no first use is the abolition of nuclear weapons, there is no proof there is correlation between the two. If in the end no-first use is neither here nor there, why spend political capital on the issue?"

#### Political capital is necessary – the budget is the litmus test for Obama

Wolf 9/12/13 (Z. Byron, "Analysis: Is Obama A Winner or Loser on Syria")

The president just seems to be very uncomfortable with being commander in chief of this nation," Corker said, although he added that he hopes the new diplomatic track pans out.¶ "He just can't follow through," said Corker, who was clearly frustrated that the president hadn't made a stronger argument to the nation that when an American president draws a red line, no country should be able to cross it without repercussions.¶ Obama will need senators like Corker to work with him now that Syria has been paused on Capitol Hill. Given Americans' continued focus on the economy, this president may be judged more for how he handles the looming two-headed fiscal dragon of government funding and debt ceiling authority.¶ Those issues will fester over the next two weeks until government funding runs out October 1 and the debt limit is reached [as soon as October 18](http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/10/news/economy/debt-ceiling-bills-coming-due/index.html).¶ On those matters, he's not going to get any help from Putin. He must figure out how to work with Congress.

#### The plan is a huge loss for Obama –Democrats cracking down on war powers makes Obama look weak costs pc

Paterno 6/23/2013 (Scott, Writer for Rock the Capital, “Selfish Obama” http://www.rockthecapital.com/06/23/selfish-obama/)

Now we have a Democratic president who wants to make war and does not want to abide by the War Powers Resolution. But rather than truly test the constitutionality of the measure, he is choosing to simply claim that THIS use of US military power is not applicable.¶ This is an extraordinarily selfish act, and one liberals especially should fear. POTUS is setting a precedent that subsequent presidents will be able to use – presidents that the left might not find so “enlightened.” Left as is, President Obama has set a standard where the president can essentially attack anywhere he wants without congressional approval for as long as he wants so long as he does not commit ground forces.¶ That is an extraordinarily selfish act. Why selfish? Because the president is avoiding congress because he fears a rebuke – from his own party, no less. The politically safe way to both claim to be decisive and to not face political defeat at the hands of Democrats – a defeat that would signal White House weakness – is to avoid congress all together. Precedent be damned, there is an election to win after all.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling has economic ripple effects – investor uncertainty

Masters 13 (Jonathan, Deputy Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, jan 2 2013"US Debt Ceiling. Costs and Consequences")

Most economists, including those in the White House and from former administrations, agree that the impact of an outright government default would be severe. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said a U.S. default could be a ["recovery-ending event"](http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/01/bernanke-warns-on-debt-limit-chaos/) that would likely spark another financial crisis. Short of default, officials warn that legislative delays in raising the debt ceiling could also inflict significant harm on the economy.¶ Many analysts say congressional gridlock over the debt limit will likely sow significant uncertainty in the bond markets and place upward pressure on interest rates. Rate increases would not only hike future borrowing costs of the federal government, but would also raise capital costs for struggling U.S. businesses and cash-strapped homebuyers. In addition, rising rates could divert future taxpayer money away from much-needed federal investments in such areas as infrastructure, education, and health care.¶ The protracted and politically acrimonious debt limit showdown in the summer 2011 prompted Standard and Poor's to take the unprecedented step of downgrading the U.S. credit rating from its triple-A status, and analysts fear such brinksmanship in early 2013 could bring about similar moves from other rating agencies.¶ A 2012 study by the non-partisan Government Accountability Office estimated that [delays in raising the debt ceiling](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-701) in 2011 cost taxpayers approximately $1.3 billion for FY 2011. BPC estimated the ten-year costs of the prolonged fight at roughly $19 billion.¶ The stock market also was thrown into frenzy in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2011 debt limit debate, with the [Dow Jones Industrial Average](http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2011/08/08/slideshow-dows-10-worst-days-ever.html) plunging roughly 2,000 points from the final days of July through the first days of August. Indeed, the Dow recorded one of its worst single-day drops in history on August 8, the day after the S&P downgrade, tumbling 635 points.¶ Speaking to the [Economic Club of New York](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/idUSW1E8KA00A20121120) in November 2012, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke warned that congressional inaction with regard to the fiscal cliff, the raising of the debt ceiling, and the longer-term budget situation was creating uncertainty that "appears already to be affecting private spending and investment decisions and may be contributing to an increased sense of caution in financial markets, with adverse effects on the economy."

#### Impact is global nuclear war

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greaterconflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### T

#### Interpretation - Armed forces only includes United States troops – explicitly excludes weapons systems

Lorber 13 (Eric, JD U of Penn Law School, Phd Duke U, Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol 15: 3 "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?")

As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 “armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiersand members of the armed forces,not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.181 Thus, it appears that the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182 By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary— language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non- members constituting armed forces).183 Second, the term “member” does not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces” refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central Intelligence Agency).184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback,185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces” centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S. combat troops.

Violation- Non First Use isn’t armed forces

Limits and ground- opens the floodgate to any small weapons system- impossible research burden

Voting issue because if not the aff could read the same aff every year

### CP

#### The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should declare the adoption of a No First Use Policy.

#### Announcing the policy solves and is perceived by tying the US’s reputation to sticking to NFU

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, "No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy", International Security Volume 35, Number 2, Fall 2010, Project Muse)

Skeptics of the believability of NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU commitment.121 By making an NFU policy public, perhaps in the form of a presidential press conference accompanied by a formal document, the United States would increase the credibility of NFU by tying its reputation to the sustainment of and adherence to the commitment. The objective would be to bolster the credibility of an NFU policy by ensuring that noncompliance would have unacceptably high political costs.¶ A violation of NFU would likely have substantial domestic, and especially [End Page 45] international, political ramifications. Domestically, a president’s purposeful violation of an NFU pledge could incentivize the political opposition to rally strongly against the violation, providing an opportunity for vocal political opponents to generate attention and potentially bring independent voters and moderate members of the opposite political party into their camp. Internationally, breaking an NFU commitment risks damaging the United States’ reputation for honoring its commitments.122 If the United States were unwilling to adhere to its public policies regarding something as important as nuclear weapons, states might calculate that they could not trust the United States at its word. Such beliefs could weaken confidence in U.S. commitments to other unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral declarations and agreements; give states pause in considerations about entering into new agreements with the United States; and create strong doubts about the sincerity of future U.S. declaratory policies. In addition, the breach of NFU could undermine U.S. long-term security. Nuclear first use would signal that the United States believes that nuclear weapons have military utility and is willing to employ them regardless of the political costs, thereby potentially encouraging further proliferation in an attempt to deter future U.S. nuclear attacks.¶ To be sure, in the midst of an intense crisis U.S. decisionmakers, especially the president, would need to repeat and reinforce the commitment to NFU, lest an opponent fear that the United States could suddenly change its nuclear policy. During a severe crisis or a limited conventional conflict with a nucleararmed adversary, U.S. leaders would need to make frequent public statements that U.S. nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence of nuclear attacks, and nuclear retaliation would be swift and severe if the opponent chooses to use nuclear weapons. Even more important, in a crisis the United States would have to carefully coordinate its declaratory policy and actions, especially with regard to alerting nuclear forces. If in a crisis an opponent perceives the alert status of U.S. nuclear (and conventional) forces as too high, the leadership might be inclined to believe that NFU is a bluff and the United States is preparing for a possible first strike. Consequently, to enhance the credibility of NFU in a crisis, U.S. decisionmakers would need to pay careful attention to the alert status of both U.S. nuclear forces and those of the opponent and ensure that, at a maximum, the alert status of U.S. forces were raised on a tit-for-tat basis with the opponent. In such cases, the president could announce a decision to raise [End Page 46] the alert level of U.S. forces as a reciprocal response to the adversary’s actions, while reinforcing the U.S. commitment to NFU.¶ Conclusion¶ Arguments for a U.S. policy of no first use have traditionally been met with fierce resistance from some elements of the defense and foreign policy communities. Policymakers and defense planners are always reluctant to deprive the commander in chief of any potential military options. Yet a fundamental tenet of deterrence theory, first articulated and popularized by Thomas Schelling, is that limiting one’s options can be beneficial for deterrence and strategic stability.123 By foreclosing the U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first, NFU would enhance crisis stability, bolster conventional deterrence, and provide the United States with renewed political legitimacy and leverage as the leader of the global nonproliferation regime. For the United States, the continued threat to use nuclear weapons first is either militarily useless or potentially destabilizing, and the actual use of nuclear weapons first is politically untenable and militarily dangerous.

#### Executive declarations solve

Perry 09 (Ken Berry is an the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Research Coordinator, “DRAFT TREATY ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS”, June 2009)

Adoption of such a policy could be done in a number of ways. The most obvious and immediate ones would include unilateral or joint declarations by the nuclear armed states. The value of public declarations should not be undervalued. As one recent writer has put it in relation to the United States:¶ Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the US government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. Such signals are similarly meant to enhance reassurance of allies. Declaratory policy can indirectly influence the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by dissuading governments or individuals from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organisations and by making terrorist use of a nuclear weapon appear immoral and illegitimate to some individuals who might otherwise support the terrorists’ goals. Finally, statements about doctrine can influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapons states about their own nuclear doctrines or potential nuclear-weapons acquisition.

#### Congressional control is bad

#### a) Budget fights cause ineffective congressional control of nuclear weapons

Schwartz 08 (Stephen I. Schwartz is Editor of The Nonproliferation Review and WMD Junction, Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons", http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/congressional-oversight-nuclear-weapons/, October 01, 2008)

With few exceptions, Congress has historically shown little interest in nuclear weapons matters except where budgets or constituent needs are concerned.[1] Those members that did follow the issue either chaired a relevant committee or subcommittee or represented a state or district housing one or more nuclear weapons installations.¶ Congressional oversight can have two connotations—to look over and to overlook. Too often, Congress, by its own admission, has practiced the latter. Given that U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs have consumed at least $7.5 trillion (in adjusted 2005 dollars) since 1940 this is surprising, until one realizes that insufficient oversight contributed to Congress' lack of knowledge about the overall scale of the program. In fact, congressional scrutiny of nuclear weapons programs can be characterized as a story of extremes—long periods of inattention punctuated by short periods of concern and action. In general, Congress has taken action following a crisis or scandal (real or perceived), which typically focuses significant media or public attention on a specific problem.¶ In 1984, then Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), a member of the Armed Services Committee since 1972, told a reporter, "The budget cycle drives the Congress, and the Congress drives the executive branch to such an extent that we don't have time to think about strategy. We never had a strategy hearing since I've been in the Senate."[2] Four years later, amidst mounting revelations that the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons facilities were unsafe to both workers and the general public, Representative John Spratt (Democrat of South Carolina), told a reporter, "In truth, most of our time is spent on the annual budget process and we have little left for oversight."[3] In fact, the last hearings in the House of Representatives on nuclear strategy were in the mid-1990s and the last Senate hearing was before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1980 and concerned President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 59, which mandated more flexible nuclear strike options and stated that U.S. nuclear forces must be able to find and win a protracted nuclear war.[4]¶ This inattention and lack of sustained focus led to critical disconnects between what Congress thought it was achieving with U.S. nuclear policy and what was actually happening. One of the most striking of these concerns the popular notion in the 1950s that nuclear weapons provided "a bigger bang for a buck."[5] Policymakers assumed that because a conventional bomb could kill tens or a few hundred people while one nuclear weapon could kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people, nuclear weapons were therefore more cost effective.[6] Because the Soviet Union was believed to field superior conventional forces, and because it was felt that the United States could engage in a conventional arms race with the Soviet Union and remain financially solvent, nuclearizing conventional forces was considered an ideal solution. But neither Congress nor the military leaders that supported this policy (largely for their own parochial reasons) understood that this was a gross oversimplification and that in many ways nuclear weapons were more expensive than conventional ones. Moreover, nuclear weapons never replaced conventional weapons, so the theoretical savings were never realized. Yet after authorizing a massive expansion in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the early 1950s (largely in response to the Korean War), Congress never examined or reevaluated its assumptions, even after military leaders began to realize they were mistaken.[7]

#### b) Secrecy, lack of resources, and bureaucracy make Congress ineffective

Schwartz 08 (Stephen I. Schwartz is Editor of The Nonproliferation Review and WMD Junction, Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons", http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/congressional-oversight-nuclear-weapons/, October 01, 2008)

In addition, as we have seen many members feel they lack the knowledge necessary to understand these programs (the abolition of the congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1994 by the newly-elected Republican majority did not help matters). The secrecy surrounding many nuclear programs also serves as a formidable barrier to acquiring knowledge from the often reluctant executive branch, conducting oversight, or engaging in discussions with colleagues or constituents. With so many more pressing matters on their agenda, and with few places to turn for on the job training, members gravitate to issues they know. Personal and committee staff resources are also limited, so that staffers typically cover several broad issues areas, constraining their ability to focus in a sustained and effective way on nuclear weapons.¶ And finally, the organizational structure of Congress divides jurisdiction for nuclear weapons issues among dozens of committees and subcommittees, preventing anyone from being able to see the big picture. The annual budget authorization and appropriation process also ensures that most of the attention will be on the proposed budget and what it will buy and not on the policies use to justify the spending programs in those budgets.

### DA

#### Only the executive can hold itself accountable ---- external restrictions hamper Obama’s credibility

POSNER 2011 - Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School (Eric A. Posner, “Deference To The Executive In The United States After September 11: Congress, The Courts, And The Office Of Legal Counsel”, http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PosnerFinal.pdf)

Let us consider the stages in reverse order. We already have addressed some of the problems with Professor Holmes’s ar‐ gument from protocols. Rules are seldom as bright‐line as they first appear. They often turn out to be presumptions which are themselves subject to standards (drive under the speed limit unless there is an emergency). It is true that security threats, like medical emergencies, often fall into patterns and can be addressed in partially rule‐governed fashion. Thus, when a gunman takes a hostage, the police follow certain rules: first clearing the area, then making contact with the gunman, and so on. Some officers will be given very simple rule‐governed tasks (“don’t let anyone cross this line”). But the rules quickly give out. Every hostage‐taker is different, and the most highly trained police officers will be given a great deal of discretion to deal with him and to make the crucial decision to use force. But even these types of threats are simple compared with the scenario that opened up on September 11. The government knew virtually nothing about the nature of the threat. It did not know how many more members of al Qaeda were in the United States, what their plans were, what resources were at their disposal, what their motives were, or how much support they had among American Muslims. 28 Protocols were worthless because nothing like the attack had ever happened before. (The closest analogy seemed to be the absurdly irrelevant example of Pearl Harbor.) The government could not follow rules; it had to improvise subject to a vague standard—protect the public while maintaining civil liberties to the extent possible. Improvise it did—instituting detentions, sweeps, profiling, surveillance, and many other policies on an unprecedented (in peacetime, if that was what it was) scale. 29

For the rule‐application stage, the deference thesis counsels Congress and the judiciary to (presumptively) defer. Congress simply cannot set about holding hearings, debating policy, and voting on laws in the midst of emergency. Either the problem will not be addressed, or Congress will end up voting on a bill that it has not written, debated, or even read. 30 For courts, too, the alternatives are unrealistic. If courts enforce rules developed for normal times, then they will interfere with the proper response to the terrorist threat, just as they would if they required the U.S. military to comply with the Fourth Amendment on the battlefield. Alternatively, the courts could insist on applying a standard and halt executive actions that, in the courts’ view, violated the standard described above—protect the nation while maintaining civil liberties to the extent possible. But here the courts are at a significant disadvantage. They do not have information about the nature of the threat. 31 Courts can demand this information from the government, but the government will not give it to them because the government fears leaks (to say nothing of recalcitrance caused by rivalries among intelligence agencies). Moreover, judges are inexperienced in national security unlike the specialists in the executive branch.

None of this is to deny Professor Holmes’s basic point that protocols can be valuable. Indeed, the Bush administration was as protocol‐happy as any other institution. Consider the protocols for interrogation which were disclosed in a leaked OLC memo: In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an in‐ clined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. . . . During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty‐four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. 32

So not even the Bush administration disagreed with Profes‐ sor Holmes’s argument that lower‐level officials faced with re‐ current situations should be subject to protocols where they are appropriate. In this sense, Professor Holmes’s argument misses the mark entirely. The problem was not so much that protocols were not used; the problem, if it was a problem, was that they were developed, modified, and revised solely by the executive branch. This leads to the question of rule development.

Recall that Professor Holmes says that the argument that the executive can act more swiftly than Congress and the courts does not apply to the rule‐development stage because the crisis is past even if the threat remains. 33 But if we think back to September 11, the crisis did not end on that day, even if the immediate threat of violence did. It was reasonable to believe that other plots had been put into action and that violence could erupt at any moment. As the weeks and months passed, these concerns faded. But it also became clear that al Qaeda had sympathizers in the United States, and that these people might strike at any time, possibly on their own initiative, or volunteer for training that would later make them considerably more dangerous. The anthrax scare brought home the possibility that al Qaeda could use even more deadly weapons than hijacked airplanes. Every day brought another revelation of a hole in border security. Thus, it was a matter of urgency to develop new rules that would address the threat.

 The government maintained the confidentiality of a constant supply of intelligence, for fear of exposing sources and meth‐ ods. 34 Meanwhile, the government was already taking secret actions (many of which were later exposed), including tapping cell phone calls, tracking monetary transfers, and infiltrating terrorist organizations. 35 Optimal policy going forward necessarily depended on secrecy. Policy X, which might seem plausible given publicly available information, might turn out to be unnecessary, redundant, or even counterproductive in light of secret information about the activities of al Qaeda or secret Pol‐ icy Y. Thus, although Congress could no doubt give useful advice, it seems hard to believe that it could have contributed much to the development of counterterrorism tactics, any more than it can contribute to military tactics (where to invade, where to bomb) during a regular war.

A set of constitutional protocols normally applies to the making of policy and its embodiment in government action. The executive must act with Congress, and it must respect the courts; it cannot act by itself. But these rules apply to normal times, and the medical protocol analogy is of little use here. Medical protocols do not need to be secret because patients have no incentive to game them—unlike terrorists who benefit greatly from knowing the methods that the United States uses to spy on them, capture them, and interrogate them. Furthermore, medical protocols are not based on secret information; they are based on widely available medical research. Thus, when medical researchers develop medical protocols at the rule development stage, they can do so publicly without undermining the purpose of developing the protocols in the first place.

By contrast, rules governing counterterrorism operations must be developed mostly in secret, and mostly on the basis of secret information. Hence the importance of keeping rule development as much as possible *within* the only branch that possesses the power to act against security threats. Those rules, of course, would constrain only lower‐level executive agents, not the executive itself. There is an obvious reason for this; if the rules are wrong, they need to be corrected. It would similarly make little sense for doctors to develop emergency room protocols that could never be changed in the future as new technologies and new health problems rendered the old protocols worthless. Professor Holmes argues that the executive becomes subject to groupthink and other decision‐making pathologies when it makes policy itself rather than with Congress and other agents. 36 But the same point can be made about executive decisionmaking during regular wars, when the risk of groupthink (if it is a risk) is tolerated because of the need for secrecy.

If Congress and the judiciary cannot constrain the executive during emergencies because of the problem of secrecy, then perhaps this problem can be overcome by putting the source of constraint in the executive branch itself, where norms of secrecy prevail. That brings us to the Office of Legal Counsel.

#### Damaging Obama’s credibility makes conflict more likely throughout the globe ---- specifically terrorism, Iraq, Iran, the MENA region

COVARRUBIAS 2009 - teaches @ University of Southern Mississippi, M.A., Political Science (Matthew A. Williams and Jack Covarrubias, “Rebalancing America’s War on Terror: President Obama”, 261-267)

President Obama is coming into his Presidency facing an established foreign policy regime. 5 George W. Bush created new commitments for the Us in a revision of American foreign policy to reflect the political circumstances of the post September 11 environment. The President traditionally has increased flexibility in this arena. 6 President Obama and his cabinet will have to determine whether the Bush doctrine is suited to current threats and trends. The new Administration will attempt to bear out a modified foreign policy regime and re-evaluate international commitments—a process that is already initiated. Thus far President Obama’s actions in Iraq and Afghanistan—decreasing troop levels in Iraq and increasing numbers in Afghanistan—are consistent with the exiting Bush foreign policy.

The moral and philosophical implications of waging the War on Terror continue to be a challenge for thinkers. The legitimacy of US efforts in the fight against terrorists continues to be questioned. Does this constitute a “just use” of military force? Effective foreign policy formulation, according to an earlier chapter in this reader, relies on the justified use of military force and the conception of the national interest. Assessing the War on Terror against the criterion of just war theory lends insight as to whether the ends of the US-led war are the “… result of good or bad foreign policy.” 7 This type of analysis is necessitated because US policies emanating from this military effort profoundly effect and “shape” our world. In waging a just war, the ends must necessitate the means and a state must consider how its actions affect its citizens as well as citizens from other states. states must respond to terrorism and terrorist threats on an individual basis. In the context of just war theory, counterterrorism is of most concern because of US use of military force. Operation enduring freedom, in both its cause and intent, can be understood as a just conflict. The Bush Doctrine, which provides a basis for the use of preemptive and preventative military force, pushes the bounds of what has traditionally been understood as a justifiable war. By traditional definitions and parameters, then, while the Afghanistan war is just, operation iraqi freedom in terms of cause, intent, and proportionality is unjust. in a broader context, America’s War on Terror may have exposed the fact that wars thought to be of “lesser evil” may not be justifiable.

Establishing a definitive and specific identity of terrorists, however, is essential to fight them justly. The concept of terrorism is shrouded with ambiguity and various perspectives, and the threat is broad. Thus, in order to wage “war” against it we must identify the enemy which embodies terrorism—whether it be state, individual or group.

Also of critical importance in the United states’ continuing military and political effort to curtail the terrorist threat is the national budget and how emergent realities will inform President Obama’s prioritizing of future Us action. From an earlier chapter, it is clear that Presidents, especially in the national defense arena, are influential actors in general and shape the national budget in particular. 8 Measuring *how* influential an actor President Obama will be is crucial. One informative method is to compare how his language correlates with budgetary realities. If the language “survives” with environmental changes then the individual leader can be understood as an influential actor in setting priorities. The priorities expressed in the language by President Bush focused on domestic oriented imperatives, and this point is reiterated various times in chapter 6 of this reader. Thus far, President Obama’s language evidences a similar focus. This is discussed in later sections and is consistent with Robert Kuttner’s assessment that the economic crisis will demand President Obama’s focused attention, at least inasmuch as his language. In the area of national defense and homeland security spending, President Bush was very influential. In general, Presidents are more influential on national defense and homeland security than in the domestic and economic spheres of American policy. However, the President’s influence is uneven. Chapter notes that given the 2009 economic environment, Obama will have more leeway in influencing the budget and economic priorities and goals.

As an earlier chapter provided, terrorism and America’s efforts to combat it globally will have to find their place in the moral discourse of humanity. 9 Whether or not our efforts are morally conceivable is dependent on the particular outlook. One outlook offered in an earlier chapter presents the notion that there is no moral reason that terrorism cannot be defined, and it is, in fact, a moral obligation for the President to seek an explanation for citizens. 10 in direct relation to the focus of this chapter, it is explained that it is not only “morally imperative” but “pragmatic” to explain terrorist attacks which is something on which the prior President failed to adequately capitalize. To legitimize efforts such as the War on Terror they must be explained not only as moral, but pragmatic. Also discussed in an earlier chapter are the correlations between the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush (1987–1993) and George W. Bush (2001–2009). The opportunity for significant historical legacy was created with the events in New York City on September 11. 11 such events heightened the awareness of Us domestic citizens, and the need to identify an enemy seemed all the more apparent. Thus, another chapter in this reader explored the reasons underlying the identification of the “axis of evil,” and though such a confrontation is not without great risk and detriment, it may have been inevitable. Re-investment in diplomacy will be needed to mitigate any negative drawbacks. it seems clear that despite very real threats to the homeland, US efforts will continue to focus on curbing the threat abroad and achieving preventative success when or wherever possible. 12 securing the homeland has certainly evolved, but will continue to change so long as the transnational threat still exists. security threats and implications emerging from the middle east Peace Process will also continue to evolve, and the importance of strategically balancing interests is necessary so that a more successful Arab–israeli relationship can take form. 13 for obama, this will strengthen the still weakening middle east road to regional peace and stability. The US still retains strategic concerns in the middle east, primarily in terms of geopolitical stability and the war against terrorism. A two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict is not likely to satisfy all interests, but remains as a positive step in the process, according to many analysts.

Current operations in iraq and Afghanistan represent the realities of fourth generation and asymmetric warfare, in terms of both the United states’ associated failures and successes in responding to non-traditional enemies. 14 The broader reality is that transnational terrorism exists, and is currently evolving right along with processes and products of globalization. Emphasizing and assuring successful adaptation to economic globalization will likely improve conditions that are generally correlated or linked with the formation of terrorist groups. 15 This notion coincides with the crux of this chapter in suggesting that President Obama must rekindle American soft power to properly combat the current terrorist threat. Aiding underdeveloped countries in the development process is exercising soft power and is a tactical foreign policy strategy. This is the type of action that is in the current best interest of the US.

Current Threats and ApproachesPresident Obama will challenge and rebalance much of the Bush legacy. President Bush made several diplomatic efforts in his last two years 16 as President but exited leaving a turbulent global situation. According to Haass and indyk, international security issues requiring the new President’s immediate attention include

* “straining” circumstances in Iraq,
* a nuclear-capable Iran,
* a “faltering Israeli- Palestinian peace process,
* ” weak regional governance in the Middle East and Africa,
* and ultimately a diminished US status in the international community.

17 Haass and Indyk articulated what dennis Blair recognized several months later at a recent senate hearing: 18 these international issues are delicate and time is not working on President Obama’s behalf.

Tailored deterrence is the conceptual framework that the outgoing Administration began to adopt which favors adapting deterrence approaches to specific threats as they emerge. President George W. Bush, however, has maintained aspects of the Bush doctrine, such as preemptive and preventative action, throughout his tenure. His Presidency will, at least in the near future, be marked by staunch negative criticism. Another legacy of the last eight years, receiving less attention, is that no major terrorist attack has occurred on US territory since september 11. one of the goals for President Obama and his Administration is to maintain this precedent. The Bush Doctrine was promulgated in 2002 and marked the first significant change in US foreign and security policy since the end of the cold War. it emphasizes, “… preemptive military action, unilateralism, increased military capabilities, and a renewed emphasis on the promotion of democracy.” 19 The doctrine served as the basis for US efforts in the middle East and the Iraq War. Some argue it can not be reconciled because it retains aggressive stances such as preemption yet also contains idealistic goals such as democratization and soft power. President obama’s Administration is clearly favoring one side of this policy spectrum.

From the beginning of this reader, it is made clear that “terrorism” is a concept dependent on perspective. As such, much of the literature discusses terrorism in abstract terms. in a post-9/11 environment, the terrorist threat is such that reacting to its individual characteristics is necessary in attempting to combat it. The threat and capability of modern terrorist groups has heightened with the advent of weapons technologies, communications and vast improvements in transportation which have rendered temporal and spatial complexities obsolete. 20 This reality demands answers across all disciplines, academic and otherwise.

Terrorism includes actions resulting in the targeted disruption of the status- quo which attacks a citizen’s perception of individual security. Outright war or other forms of significant militarized conflict will likely remain “unthinkable” between the “most developed” international superpowers. 21 Whether America remains the predominant world power is largely contingent upon *how* the incoming Administration will confront threats from rogue nations and terrorist organizations while maintaining alliances with other great powers so that a “security community” 22 can be sustained.

Robert Jervis argues that the international system is currently characterized by an overarching “security community” consisting of the Us, Western Europe, and Japan. Jervis emphasizes that the “community” is not made up of all the great powers as China and Russia are still significant militarily, however, they lack developmental attributes that are found with their global counterparts—“… their internal regimes are shaky, they are not at the forefront of any advanced forms of technology or economic organization, they can pose challenges only regionally, and they have no attraction as models for others.” 23 The potential threat posed by Russia and China must never be completely ignored, but “great-powers” conflict on the scale of the World Wars is unlikely. Currently, conflict provoked by China or Russia will presumably reflect an attempt to gain what it considers a critical “sphere of influence.” Even the War on Terror, as Jervis argues, is unlikely to be a primary motivating factor in global politics. The US no longer has a need to protect national interests, rather it must protect democratic values and the status quo referred to by Jervis as “milieu” goals. Existing in a community that has mutual security interests redefines approaches to national security. It can be surmised that contemporary threats will not come from traditional great powers, rather those groups which directly and acutely seek to agitate the status quo.

### K

#### The 1AC’s threats are not real or objective but are filtered through a lens of threat-action discourse – that causes violence

**Grondin 4** (David, Masters in Political Science & Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies)

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

#### Security logic causes devaluation and extinction

Burke 7 (Anthony, lecturer of IR at U New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7, <http://www.hopkins-debate.com/pdf/Burke.pdf>)

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 # We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 # There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. # Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

#### The alt is to vote negative to critique the aff’s security discourse as a prior question – framing comes first

**Cheeseman and Bruce 96** (Graeme, Senior Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert, editor, widespread author on security, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Solvency

#### History proves no modeling – countries will build up arsenals to blackmail the US

David 13 (Jack David is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and was a deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiatoins policy and comabting weapons of mass destruction, Natoinal Review, " Obama’s Nuclear-Zero Dream", http://www.nationalreview.com/article/352363/obamas-nuclear-zero-dream-jack-david, June 29, 2013)

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. unilaterally reduced the number of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear-weapons and delivery systems. A decade ago, partly in coordination with Russia, it further reduced the numbers. Also, in the last 23 years, the U.S. virtually eliminated, unilaterally, its ability to develop, test, and manufacture nuclear weapons. Have these reductions had salutary effects on the conduct of other nations? Do events in the world justify a further one-third reduction in U.S. strategic nuclear weapons?¶ While the U.S. was taking these steps to reduce its nuclear-weapons and delivery capabilities, Russia was dramatically increasing its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons. Today this stockpile exceeds that of the U.S. by a factor of ten. At the same time, Russia upgraded its strategic nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and testing and manufacturing capabilities. China followed the same path as Russia. There is evidence that it also has increased its stockpile of strategic nuclear-weapons and delivery systems beyond what U.S. intelligence agencies and arms-control organizations have estimated. (President Putin recognized this about China in response to Mr. Obama’s proposal.) And we know the direction of Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs.¶ In the context of the expanded nuclear-weapons and delivery capabilities of potential aggressors, Mr. Obama’s claim that eliminating an additional one-third of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons will make us safer makes no sense. We must remember that senior military officials of both Russia and China in recent years have threatened to use nuclear weapons against the United States. Should the U.S. wish to take action regarding Syria that is not to Russia’s liking, or action in defense of Japan that is not to China’s liking, or any other action important to U.S. interests that Russia or China considers against its interests, can there be any doubt that those countries could be tempted to consider nuclear blackmail as a means of persuading the U.S. not to act?¶ In deciding whether to try nuclear blackmail against the U.S. in such a context, wouldn’t our potential adversary consider whether the U.S. has sufficient nuclear-weapons and delivery systems to retaliate? Wouldn’t our potential adversary also consider whether it could preemptively destroy such resources as we have? If the potential adversary concluded that U.S. resources were insufficient to retaliate or could be preemptively eliminated, wouldn’t the adversary be tempted to try nuclear blackmail? The answer to all these questions unquestionably is yes.

#### NFU fails – too vague

Peng and Rong 9 (Yu and Guangqian, PhD candidate at the Institute of International Strategy and Development, School of Public Policy and Management and editor-in-chief of Strategic Sciences and has long been engaged in research on military strategy and international affairs., “Nuclear No-First-Use-Revisted,” China Security, Issue 13 <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225&Itemid=8>)

There are also uncertainties that plague states pledging NFU. Modern warfare is conducted amid an increasingly complicated environment, and definitively establishing whether the adversary has broken the nuclear threshold is not necessarily a straightforward issue. For instance, if the nuclear weapons of one warring party are attacked by the adversary’s conventional weapons, resulting in nuclear radiation, nuclear contamination or even a nuclear explosion, could this be viewed as a nuclear first use? On the surface, this is merely a conventional attack, but in effect, its impact is little different than suffering a nuclear strike and incurring similarly heavy losses In this case, conventional attack might also be seen as breaking the nuclear threshold, and the attacked party will find it difficult to refrain from a nuclear counterattack, which, in turn, will greatly increase the risks that either side launches a nuclear attack first. Yet another ambiguous situation arises if an NFU state has reason to fear that an invading enemy will seize its nuclear arsenal. Under these circumstances, should a state adhere to its NFU pledge? Although not likely for big powers, this is not an implausible scenario for less powerful states. In modern local warfare and limited warfare, there are cases in which one state is invaded or occupied by another. In these situations, what is the wisest choice for the invaded party? Should it abandon its nuclear weapons to its adversary or abandon NFU? What if there is an unintentional nuclear launch due to technical error? Should this also be considered a nuclear attack despite its inadvertent nature? This could arise from technical accidents, mistakes by personnel and misinformation. Although in terms of criminal law, there is a clear distinction in the penalties between intentional and unintentional acts, it is likely impossible to discern which type of act is the cause for nuclear attack. Rather, the logical reaction would be to assume intentional attack and respond accordingly. While this would trigger an escalation of crisis, even nuclear war, indecision in the face of impending nuclear attack would mean heavy losses. It could also be used as a stratagem by the adversary that uses “accidental launch” as a pretext to launch an intentional nuclear attack. Deciphering adversary intention would be fraught with difficulty and risk.

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes are inevitable

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisionsffff. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### China

China will exploit mutual vulnerability with the United States, putting US security at risk – deterrence by denial is key.

**Pfaltzgraff ‘9** (Robert, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, “China–U.S. Strategic Stability,” 4/7, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2009npc\_prepared\_pfaltzgraff.pdf)

This, then, leads me to the conclusion that to the extent that the United States perpetuates its vulnerabilities, it provides an **open invitation** to Chinese efforts to exploit such vulnerabilities. Let me be more specific. There is considerable discussion to the effect that the United States should maintain or develop with China a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability and that increased emphasis, notably, on missile defense on our part will lead China to increase its own programs to order to counter such U.S. systems. Aside from the shaky empirical basis for such an assertion, the Chinese emphasis on exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities argues logically for efforts on our part to cut off such U.S. vulnerabilities wherever possible in the forces that will shape the China-U.S. strategic relationship in the years ahead. In fact, I could even argue that the conscious perpetuation of U.S. vulnerability in the mistaken belief that the result will be strategic stability **makes no sense.** It may even encourage China to attempt to exploit U.S. vulnerability at a time of crisis and lead to undesired **escalation based on miscalculation**. I conclude on the note that the dynamics of the China-U.S. strategic relationship as I have outlined it are such that we should obviously seek to avoid crisis miscalculation and do what we can to control escalation should we ever face a political-military crisis in which China will attempt to shape U.S. responses by working to ensure and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. For the United States strategic stability can best be enhanced by reducing vulnerabilities, including a strategic nuclear posture that includes **deterrence by denial**. Therefore, deterrence of China has both offensive and defensive elements. We will need to take seriously China’s perception of its growing nuclear weapons capability as tools of military power and political intimidation regardless of whether this is China’s motivation for such modernization or if this is the consequence of China’s military modernization. This also means rejection of a mutual vulnerability relationship with China in the **mistaken belief that this will lead China to forego modernization options.** In fact, if my analysis is correct, we will only encourage China to exploit those vulnerabilities that we are perpetuating, having therefore the reverse of the intended effect. Instead, we should work to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities. Specifically, this would mean placing greater emphasis on missile defense; reinforcing extended deterrence to allies, especially Japan; and the continued U.S. ability to project power into the Asia-Pacific area – in order to enhance stability in what will be a dynamic and changing security setting in the years ahead. Not only is strategic stability not served by offering China an assurance that the United States accepts mutual vulnerability as the basis for the strategic relationship. To the contrary, such an assurance could have the reverse effect contributing to **miscalculation and undesirable crisis escalation** – the opposite of the definitions of stability set forth at the beginning of my presentation.

Relations resilient  **Wan 10**- Staff Writer at Wall Street Journal

(William, “China: U.S. relations 'sound',” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/06/AR2010090603660.html, 9/7)

At a time of tension in U.S.-China relations, a three-day visit by senior U.S. officials to Beijing began Monday with signs that Chinese leaders want to smooth over some key frictions. "Sound" and "stable" was how a top Communist Party official described the two countries' relationship while receiving the U.S. delegation, which included National Economic Council Director Lawrence H. Summers and deputy national security adviser Thomas Donilon. The meeting comes after the U.S.-China relationship has been battered on several fronts. The United States has fought with China during the past few months over China's trade surplus and currency valuation, with little to show for it. U.S.-South Korea military exercises near the Chinese coast have incensed Chinese officials, as did President Obama's meeting with the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, both of which happened earlier this year. Rhetoric on both sides has ratcheted up in recent weeks on national security issues - with China's state-owned party papers denouncing U.S. interference in South China Sea issues, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton responding in July at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting that the area is part of her country's "national interest," which set off more fuming in party papers. On Monday, both sides expressed hope that meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials scheduled in coming weeks may help thaw some of the recent difficulties. "Although there were some disturbances in China-U.S. relations, in April and May after President Obama and President Hu Jintao had two meetings, our relations have gotten back on a sound track," Li Yuanchao, head of the section in the Chinese government that oversees senior party appointments, said before the closed-door talks began. Later Monday, according to the Associated Press, Summers told Vice Premier Wang Qishan that Obama "has emphasized for us the importance he attaches to a very strong relationship between the United Sates and China." Among this visit's top issues, Summers added, is setting up a trip for Hu to Washington. Still to come in the next few months are Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in a few weeks to the U.N. General Assembly in New York, a meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Group of 20 summit, where additional China-U.S. talks may occur. Hu is likely to visit the United States in January. Some of the most pressing issues in this week's meetings involve the Korean Peninsula, said Shi Yinhong, an international studies professor at Beijing's Renmin University. There have been icy feelings all around, he said, since the Cheonan, a warship belonging to U.S. ally South Korea, was sunk near the border of China's ally, North Korea. "Neither China nor the U.S. wants to make a concession on this," Shi said, "but the two countries also don't seem to want the relationship to deteriorate again."

### Prolif

#### No first use does not solve proliferation

Fred **Kaplan**, Slate Magazine, March 3, **2010**. “How Important is Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review?” http://www.slate.com/id/2246737/

At the same time, though, it's equally hard to see what we'd get from a policy of no-first-use, **even if** other countries' leaders believed the promise. The idea behind no-first-use is to "delegitimize" nuclear weapons—to announce to the world that the foremost nuclear power, the only nation that has ever dropped A-bombs in anger, has concluded that these things have no military utility, no place in wars of the present or the future. The problem is that history reveals they do have value, whatever we might belatedly say—not necessarily in their actual use but merely in their possession. They elevate one's standing in a region (see Pakistan); they deter others from attacking (see China in the mid-1960s or North Korea now); they can be brandished as a way of keeping others from responding to lower level forms of aggression. (If Saddam Hussein had built some nukes before invading Kuwait in 1990, it's doubtful that George H.W. Bush and James Baker could have amassed a large coalition to push him back.) Which leads to the fourth point: No matter what Washington says, or how deeply the United States or Russia or the other established nuclear powers cut their own nuclear arsenals, it will probably have minimal impact on other countries' decisions to go, or not to go, nuclear themselves. Their own interests will determine those decisions. In fact, one could argue that a U.S. pullback of this sort may make some technologically advanced countries—which have relied on America's "nuclear umbrella" for their security—to take the leap and build their own bombs.

#### Conventional Superiority trumps NFU

**The Stanley Foundation 2008** (April 4). a nonpartisan, private operating foundation that seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. “This brief summarizes the primary findings of the conference as interpreted by the project organizers. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this brief. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.” <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf> “**A New Look at No First Use”**

Some conference participants worried that adopting NFU might actually *encourage* proliferation by weakening security assurances or by suggesting a shortcut for a weak state to match our military capability. One participant speculated that this is a natural consequence of US conventional superiority and that we should consider how to redress those security imbalances. Other participants argued that the US nuclear posture is basically irrelevant as it relates to this problem: no matter what the US nuclear posture is, states will see nuclear weapons as a way of **offsetting America’s conventional military superiority**.

**No prolif cascades and long timeframe – their ev is biased**

Kahl 13 – Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Colin H., Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf>)

\*\*\*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR\*\*\*

I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTORY Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.ffffffff19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

## 2NC

#### Executive declarations creates a credible signal

Perry and Schlesinger 09 (William J. Perry, Chairman James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman of Congressional Comission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Institute of Peace Press, "America's Strategic Posture", 2009)

The Commission wishes to make five main points on declaratory policy. First, to be effective, such policy must be understood to reflect the intentions of national leadership. The president must make clear his intent, and it must echo through the words and deeds of the appropriate cabinet officers. Second, the United States should retain calculated ambiguity as an ele- ment of its nuclear declaratory policy. Potential aggressors should have to worry about the possibility that the United States might respond by overwhelming means at a time and in a manner of its choosing. Calcu- lated ambiguity may not be wise in every instance, as deterrence in crisis may be better served by being explicit. But calculated ambiguity creates uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about just how the United States might respond to an act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce restraint and caution on the part of that potential aggressor. The threat to impose unacceptable consequences on an aggressor by any means of U.S. choosing remains credible. The Commission has considered whether the United States should adopt a policy of no-first-use, whereby the United States would foreswear the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose other than in retaliation for attack by nuclear means on itself or its allies. But such a policy would be unsettling to some U.S. allies. It would also undermine the potential contribu- tions of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of attack by biological weapons. The Commission recognizes that, so long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forc- es, it no longer needs to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superi- ority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment. This too argues that calculated ambiguity continue as a key element of U.S. declaratory policy. Third, declaratory policy must reflect the central fact that the United States retains nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence—to help to create the conditions in which they are never used or even threatened. As argued in a prior chapter, the Commission conceives of deterrence in very broad terms, to include also assurance and dissuasion. Although the contemporary demands of deterrence are much different from those of the Cold War (and reliance on nuclear weapons has been appropriately reduced), the deterrence role of nuclear weapons remains crucial. Fourth, it is important that the United States signal in its declaratory policy the fact that it relies less than ever on nuclear weapons for political and military purposes. The United States should underscore that it conceives of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for protection of itself and its allies in extreme circumstances. The Commission believes that any president of the United States would avoid pushing a confrontation to the point of nuclear exchange. Fifth, the implicit tension between U.S. declaratory policy and its com- mitments under the NPT to negative and positive security assurances is long-lived and remains.

#### Limited expertise and weak budgetary power prevent effective Congressional control

Zegart 11 (Amy B. Zegart Amy Zegart is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and professor of political economy at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight,” Political Science Quarterly 126 (Spring 2011): 1–27, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges\_Zegart.pdf)

Congress is another story. Although Congress has been instrumental in many post-9/11 executive branch reforms, it has been largely unable to reform itself. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission called congressional oversight “dysfunctional” and warned that fixing oversight weaknesses would be both essential to US national security and exceedingly difficult to achieve.1 By 2007, Lee Hamilton, who served as the commission’s vice chairman and earlier as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, delivered an angry and ominous warning to the Senate Intelligence Committee:¶ To me, the strong point simply is that the Senate of the United States and the House of the United States is [sic] not doing its job. And because you’re not doing the job, the country is not as safe as it ought to be. . . . You’re dealing here with the national security of the United States, and the Senate and the House ought to have the deep down feeling that we’ve got to get this thing right.2¶ Hamilton’s words prompted vigorous nods of agreement across the aisle but never made headlines or produced major changes.3 The committee’s own reform centerpiece—consolidating appropriations and authorization powers—quickly and quietly died. In January 2010, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism concluded that congressional intelligence and homeland security reform efforts were still failing to achieve their desired results.4¶ This essay examines the roots of weak intelligence oversight and why these deficiencies have persisted for so long. Since 9/11, most explanations have focused on the Bush administration and the extent to which executive branch officials withheld information from Congress about secret and controversial programs such as the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping, the CIA’s use of harsh interrogation methods, and the establishment of CIA black sites to detain suspected terrorists abroad.5 Executive branch secrecy, however, is not the entire story. Congress has also struggled to bolster its own intelligence oversight capabilities, with limited success. What former Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, has called the “long and sordid history” of congressional oversight weaknesses began before 9/11 and continues today.6¶ I argue that many of Congress’s enduring oversight troubles lie with Congress and two institutional deficiencies in particular: limited expertise and weak budgetary power over the Intelligence Community. This is no accident. In both areas, electoral incentives and internal congressional turf battles have led Congress to tie its own hands. The result is an intelligence oversight system that is well designed to serve the reelection interests of individual legislators and protect congressional committee prerogatives but poorly designed to serve the national interest.

#### Declartatory policy avoids the political fallout from an action policy

Halperin Oct 9 (Morton., “Forum: The Case For No First Use: An Exchange” Survival, Volume 51, Issue 5, October 9)

By not explicitly foreswearing the use of nuclear weapons against unexpected threats, such a declaration preserves 'existential deterrence' that is the inescapable consequence of having any nuclear weapons and avoids much, if not all, of the political fallout that would result from a no-first-use pledge.

#### No Indo-Pak War

Wright ‘13 (Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Managing Global Order project. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security, "Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/>, January 16, 2013)

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.

#### Obama ignores restrictions- tons of loopholes

**Kumar 3-19**-13 [Anita, White House correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, former writer for The Washington Post, covering Virginia politics and government, and spent a decade at the St. Petersburg Times, writing about local, state and federal government both in Florida and Washington, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Ue18CdK1FSE>]

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress.¶ Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way.¶ He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals.¶ While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider.¶ He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change.¶ Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.¶ “It’s gridlocked and dysfunctional. The place is a mess,” said Rena Steinzor, a law professor at the University of Maryland. “I think (executive action) is an inevitable tool given what’s happened.”¶ Now that Obama has showed a willingness to use those tactics, advocacy groups, supporters and even members of Congress are lobbying him to do so more and more.¶ The Center for Progressive Reform, a liberal advocacy group composed of law professors, including Steinzor, has pressed Obama to sign seven executive orders on health, safety and the environment during his second term.¶ Seventy environmental groups wrote a letter urging the president to restrict emissions at existing power plants.¶ Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., the chairwoman of the Appropriations Committee, sent a letter to the White House asking Obama to ban federal contractors from retaliating against employees who share salary information.¶ Gay rights organizations recently demonstrated in front of the White House to encourage the president to sign an executive order to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity by companies that have federal contracts, eager for Obama to act after nearly two decades of failed attempts to get Congress to pass a similar bill.¶ “It’s ridiculous that we’re having to push this hard for the president to simply pick up a pen,” said Heather Cronk, the managing director of the gay rights group GetEQUAL. “It’s reprehensible that, after signing orders on gun control, cybersecurity and all manner of other topics, the president is still laboring over this decision.”¶ The White House didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment.¶ In January, Obama said he continued to believe that legislation was “sturdier and more stable” than executive actions, but that sometimes they were necessary, such as his January directive for the federal government to research gun violence.¶ “There are certain issues where a judicious use of executive power can move the argument forward or solve problems that are of immediate-enough import that we can’t afford not to do it,” the former constitutional professor told The New Republic magazine.¶ Presidents since George Washington have signed executive orders, an oft-overlooked power not explicitly defined in the Constitution. More than half of all executive orders in the nation’s history – nearly 14,000 – have been issued since 1933.

#### Obama will circumvent Congress and the courts

**Kumar 3-19**-13 [Anita, White House correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, former writer for The Washington Post, covering Virginia politics and government, and spent a decade at the St. Petersburg Times, writing about local, state and federal government both in Florida and Washington, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Ue18CdK1FSE>]

“The expectation is that they all do this,” said Ken Mayer, a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who wrote “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” “That is the typical way of doing things.”¶ But, experts say, Obama’s actions are more noticeable because as a candidate he was critical of Bush’s use of power. In particular, he singled out his predecessor’s use of signing statements, documents issued when a president signs a bill that clarifies his understanding of the law.¶ “These last few years we’ve seen an unacceptable abuse of power at home,” Obama said in an October 2007 speech.. “We’ve paid a heavy price for having a president whose priority is expanding his own power.”¶ Yet Obama’s use of power echoes that of his predecessors. For example, he signed 145 executive orders in his first term, putting him on track to issue as many as the 291 that Bush did in two terms.¶ John Yoo, who wrote the legal opinions that supported an expansion of presidential power after the 2001 terrorist attacks, including harsh interrogation methods that some called torture, said he thought that executive orders were sometimes appropriate – when conducting internal management and implementing power given to the president by Congress or the Constitution – but he thinks that Obama has gone too far.¶ “I think President Obama has been as equally aggressive as President Bush, and in fact he has sometimes used the very same language to suggest that he would not obey congressional laws that intrude on his commander-in-chief power,” said Yoo, who’s now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley. “This is utterly hypocritical, both when compared to his campaign stances and the position of his supporters in Congress, who have suddenly discovered the virtues of silence.”¶ Most of Obama’s actions are written statements aimed at federal agencies that are published everywhere from the White House website to the Federal Register. Some are classified and hidden from public view.¶ “It seems to be more calculated to prod Congress,” said Phillip J. Cooper, the author of “By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action.” “I can’t remember a president being that consistent, direct and public.”¶ Bush was criticized for many of his actions on surveillance and interrogation techniques, but attention has focused on Obama’s use of actions mostly about domestic issues.¶ In his first two years in the White House, when fellow Democrats controlled Capitol Hill, Obama largely worked through the regular legislative process to try to achieve his domestic agenda. His biggest achievements – including a federal health care overhaul and a stimulus package designed to boost the economy –came about with little or no Republican support.¶ But Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 2010, making the task of passing legislation all the more difficult for a man with a detached personality who doesn’t relish schmoozing with lawmakers. By the next year, Obama wasn’t shy about his reasons for flexing his presidential power.¶ In fall 2011, he launched the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, unveiling dozens of policies through executive orders – creating jobs for veterans, adopting fuel efficiency standards and stopping drug shortages – that came straight from his jobs bills that faltered in Congress.¶ “We’re not waiting for Congress,” Obama said in Denver that year when he announced a plan to reduce college costs. “I intend to do everything in my power right now to act on behalf of the American people, with or without Congress. We can’t wait for Congress to do its job. So where they won’t act, I will.”¶ When Congress killed legislation aimed at curbing the emissions that cause global warming, Obama directed the Environmental Protection Agency to write regulations on its own incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ When Congress defeated pro-union legislation, he had the National Labor Relations Board and the Labor Department issue rules incorporating some parts of the bill.¶ “The president looks more and more like a king that the Constitution was designed to replace,” Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said on the Senate floor last year.¶ While Republicans complain that Obama’s actions cross a line, experts say some of them are less aggressive than they appear.¶ After the mass shooting in Newtown, Conn., in December, the White House boasted of implementing 23 executive actions to curb gun control. In reality, Obama issued a trio of modest directives that instructed federal agencies to trace guns and send information for background checks to a database.¶ In his State of the Union address last month, Obama instructed businesses to improve the security of computers to help prevent hacking. But he doesn’t have the legal authority to force private companies to act.¶ “The executive order can be a useful tool but there are only certain things he can do,” said Melanie Teplinsky, an American University law professor who’s spoken extensively on cyber-law.¶ Executive actions often are fleeting. They generally don’t settle a political debate, and the next president, Congress or a court may overturn them.¶ Consider the so-called Mexico City policy. With it, Reagan banned federal money from going to international family-planning groups that provide abortions. Clinton rescinded the policy. George W. Bush reinstated it, and Obama reversed course again.¶ But congressional and legal action are rare. In 1952, the Supreme Court threw out Harry Truman’s order authorizing the seizure of steel mills during a series of strikes. In 1996, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed an order by Clinton that banned the government from contracting with companies that hire workers despite an ongoing strike.¶ Obama has seen some pushback.¶ Congress prohibited him from spending money to move inmates from the Guantanamo Bay U.S. naval base in Cuba after he signed an order that said it would close. A Chinese company sued Obama for killing its wind farm projects by executive order after he said they were too close to a military training site. A federal appeals court recently ruled that he’d exceeded his constitutional powers when he named several people to the National Labor Relations Board while the Senate was in recess.¶ But Obama appears to be undaunted.¶ “If Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations,” he told Congress last month, “I will.”

#### No accidental launch

Williscroft ‘10 (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan* & *Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm, 2010)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### No impact to prolif – it’s slow, only .05% of states have nukes, conventional war is far more likely, 60+ years prove deterrence works

DeGarmo 11

Denise, professor of international relations at Southern Illinois University, “Proliferation Leads to Peace”

Unfortunately, while the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow. From 1945 to 1970, only six countries acquired nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession. Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club. Included on this list are such actors as: [Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm). The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes. It is important to point out that while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21**st** century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War era. The fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states. In other words, states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare.

#### No China threat

Eland ‘13 (Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He also has served as Evaluator-in-Charge (national security and intelligence) for the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office), “Threat From China Is Being Hyped”, http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2013/06/04/threat-from-china-is-being-hyped/, June 5, 2013)

Articles in the American media usually portray China as a potential adversary, and recent press coverage is no exception. Stories have appeared about China’s military hacking into the computer systems of the American government and business and Chinese oil companies’ reaping of unfair gains in Iraq on the backs of dead American soldiers. Yet the threat from China in the popular American mind instilled by such articles is overblown. Undoubtedly, the U.S. military and intelligence services also attempt to hack into Chinese computer systems; this unseemly fact is glossed over by the usually nationalist American media. Even if Chinese military espionage is taken in isolation, it indicates that the Chinese realize a technological gap exists between China and the West and that they are having trouble developing technologies themselves. Similarly, the same conclusions could be reached about the much-ballyhooed Chinese purchase of Russian military equipment. In contrast, the United States develops its own military technologies, and they are the best in the world. Although Chinese defense spending has been growing at a double digit annual pace for a while now, China’s military started from only a low base. Chinese yearly defense spending is still only a fifth of that of the United States and the results of that annual disparity have [has] accumulated over many years in a vastly superior U.S. military force. Also, much of China’s recent increases in defense spending have been spent increasing military pay to keep people from defecting to the white-hot civilian economy and converting a Maoist people’s land army into one more designed to project power from China’s coasts using air and sea power. Both of these requirements have constrained the purchase of new weaponry. Even so, China has made gains in its ability to project power, recently obtaining a small, old Ukrainian aircraft carrier. Yet carrier operations take a long time to master, and China is still very limited in its power projection capability. Also, China’s imitation of the United States in emphasis on carrier forces could be ill advised. In any naval war, carriers may very well prove vulnerable to submarines using cruise missiles and torpedoes. To the extent that pursuing carriers has an opportunity cost for the Chinese in forgoing more of those potent sea-denial forces, it may lessen China’s ability to defend itself against U.S. carriers. China’s sea-denial forces make up any real threat to the all-in U.S. force of 11 large deck carriers. But of course this threat is to the American Empire, not the United States itself. The U.S. carrier-heavy force is deployed far forward in East Asia to contain China and protect allies, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Australia. Those wealthy allies should be doing more to provide their own security but will never do so as long as the United States provides the first line of defense. Japan already has a stronger navy than China and could do much more if it spent more of its large GDP on defense. As for Taiwan, being an easily defended island nation (amphibious assaults are notoriously difficult), it doesn’t need to match China dollar for dollar on defense spending but merely needs to adopt a porcupine strategy by being able to deter the same by inflicting unacceptable damage on the attacker. Finally, an American retraction of its defense perimeter to Hawaii and Guam would undoubtedly motivate these four nations, plus others in the region such as the Philippines and Vietnam, to band together in an alliance to be the first line of defense against China. Because China’s ability to project military power is so limited, the fears that China is expanding in Africa and the Middle East are fanciful. For example, recent press articles have implied that Chinese state-owned oil companies have exploited the American invasion of Iraq to win oil contracts from the Iraqi government. Because they don’t have to satisfy private shareholders, those companies can accept low profit margins on oil contracts that Western companies, such as Exxon, cannot. To some neoconservatives, such as Victor Davis Hanson, such failure of America to economically exploit its military empire is praiseworthy; to other imperialists, it is merely foolish. In any event, such Chinese commercial penetration is little threat to the United States and may actually be of some help. Because a worldwide oil market exists and any new petroleum being produced anywhere lowers the price for everyone, Chinese state-owned companies may be indirectly subsidizing U.S. oil consumers by bringing to market oil deposits that would be uneconomical for private firms to find and pump. Of course, implicitly, a worldwide oil market would also obviate the need for the military forces of the United States, China, or any other nation to “secure” oil. In my award-winning book No War for Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East, I explain why it is cheaper to just pay higher prices caused by any disruption of Middle Eastern oil than to pay for forward-deployed military forces to attempt to prevent this rare occurrence. In conclusion, the Chinese “threat” is being dragged out and hyped to attempt to forestall cuts in U.S. security budgets, not because it severely undermines American security.

## 1NR

#### Diversionary theory means countries turn outward—causes conflict

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8 ([Aaron Friedberg](http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=AARON+FRIEDBERG&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND) and [Gabriel Schoenfeld](http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=GABRIEL+SCHOENFELD&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND) October 21, 2008 Mr. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Mr. Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J. “The Dangers of a Diminished America | In the 1930s, isolationism and protectionism spurred the rise of fascism.” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>)

The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

#### Economic decline causes war with China

Ockham Research 8(“Economic Distress and Geopolitical Risks”, November, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/106562-economic-distress-and-geopolitical-risks>)

China too is threatened by the global economic downturn. There is no doubt that China has emerged during the past decade as a major economic power. Parts of the country have been transformed by its meteoric growth. However, in truth, only about a quarter of the nation’s billion plus inhabitants—those living in the thriving cities on the coast and in Beijing—have truly felt the impact of the economic boom. Many of these people have now seen a brutal bear market and are adjusting to economic loss and diminished future prospects. However, the vast majority of China’s population did not benefit from the economic boom and could become increasingly restive in an economic slowdown. Enough economic hardship could conceivably threaten the stability of the regime and would more than likely make China more bellicose and unpredictable in its behavior, with dangerous consequences for the U.S. and the world.

#### Economic decline turns deterrence

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### Economic decline causes massive prolif

Schrage 9 (Michael J. Green and Steven P., Michael J. Green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Steven P. Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a Former Senior Official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, *It's not just the economy*, Available Online @ the Asian Times)

Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system

#### Government shutdown wrecks CDC disease monitoring – key to check outbreaks

Emily Walker, 4-8-2011, "Both Sides Claim Win as Shutdown Averted," Med Page Today, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/25826

The vast majority of employees at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would be furloughed if the government ceased operations, said an HHS spokesman. Because the CDC tracks new public health threats such as disease outbreaks, the worst-case scenario during a shutdown would be a massive outbreak of a food-borne illness or other communicable disease. The CDC's emergency operation center -- a command center for monitoring and coordinating CDC's emergency response to public health threats in the United States and abroad -- will remain open. The center is currently working on responses to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. But responses may be delayed, the spokesman said. "If a state were to call us and say 'We need help,' we may not be able to respond quickly," the spokesman said. While emergency workers will continue their jobs, the staff who work to "get people out the door," by booking travel and facilitating meetings, won't be working. "This would prevent us from responding as quickly as we'd like," the spokesman said. In addition, the CDC's ability to detect an outbreak could be jeapordized, he said. "We have a lot of disease surveillance networks. If those are scaled back to just the staff that monitor those networks, it could conceivably lead to us not being able to detect an outbreak as quickly as we'd like to. We simply won't have the manpower we have right now," the HHS spokesman said.

Disease causes extinction- prefer most recent evidence that takes their authors into account

Shapiro 9/16 (Eliza, is a reporter for The Daily Beast, covering breaking news, crime, and politics. Previously, she worked at Capital New York, September 16, 2013, “A Scarier Bird Flu: CDC Chief Warns of Looming H7N9 Threat”, http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors/eliza-shapiro.html///TS)

It was not an event for germophobes, as the CDC’s director described the crises Americans may soon face: an uncontainable virus, killer measles, and even the plague. ¶ Be afraid. Be very afraid.¶ While the U.S. public-health system has made major strides in stopping smoking and preventing HIV/AIDS, there is still [a slew of infectious diseases](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/07/drug-resistant-gonorrhea-the-sex-superbug-is-not-worse-than-aids.html), new and old, that all Americans need to start thinking about.¶ Centers for Disease Control director Thomas Frieden outlined the looming crises in a talk this week, focusing on awareness and prevention while still name dropping a lot of scary stuff: the plague, bird flu, and killer measles. It was not a day for germophobes.¶ Never heard of [H7N9 flu](http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm)? Well, you might soon. It’s a recently discovered form of bird flu that Frieden said “is acting quite a bit like SARS,” the viral respiratory infection that has killed more than 8,000 people and created a worldwide panic in 2003.¶ [H7N9](http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2013/04/05/china-kills-birds-after-sixth-flu-death.html) is lethal and spreads faster than [any other identified strain of bird flu](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/14/flu-fears-the-race-between-pandemic-viruses-and-a-universal-vaccine.html). It moves from animals to humans, but, unlike previous versions of bird flu, doesn’t make animals sick. As a result, infected flocks can’t be contained, and there’s no effective vaccine.¶ This strain was discovered in China this past April. Of the 130 human infections reported, there were 44 deaths related to respiratory illnesses. Most of the infections were found in people with direct exposure to poultry.¶ Infections in China have tapered off, but this bird flu appears to be as seasonal as human flus, and may come back stronger as it gets colder.¶ “The only thing protecting us from a global pandemic right now is the fact that it doesn’t yet spread from person to person,” Frieden told the National Press Club on Tuesday. Gulp.¶ He’s also concerned about antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis, which he said is “spreading in long-term-care facilities and hospitals widely.” Then there are what the CDC calls “intentional diseases”—chemicals or diseases like anthrax, which could be used as biological weapons.¶ What’s highest on Frieden’s agenda? The plague.¶ After a person in rural Uganda was infected with the plague by a sick rat or flea [this year](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/cdc-fights-plague-uganda-eye-biodefense/), 130 people were given preventive medication by CDC workers. That infection was contained.¶ But this scourge of the Middle Ages could have a terrifying modern application, too: “Plague is one of the organisms that we’re concerned about in terms of its potentially being used as a bio weapon,” Frieden said.¶ Another illness you might want to start taking seriously: the measles. ¶ There are still over 400 deaths a day from measles around the planet, Frieden said, with plenty of infections in the U.S. from a malady he called “perhaps the most infectious of all the infectious diseases.”¶ “If you take, oh, let’s say a room with a couple hundred people in it, and there is one person coughing with measles and there are just three or four others who are susceptible, they’ll probably get it. It’s that infectious,” he said.¶ It wasn’t all bad news from Frieden.¶ The most preventable cause of death—smoking—has plummeted among Americans in recent years. Frieden pointed to CDC data that show more than 1 million Americans have tried to quit smoking, and 100,000 or more have quit smoking altogether. And, crediting the [President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief](http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm), Frieden said some 5.5 million more people are able to live full lives even if they are HIV-positive.¶ Still—what about H7N9, drug-resistant TB, measles … and the plague?¶

#### -- Democrats are confident that the House will raise the debt ceiling now – high level statements prove

Bolton 9/14/13 (Alexander, Writer for the Hill, "Confident Democrats Want Separate Showdowns on Shutdown and Debt Limit")

¶ Senate Democrats want to have separate fights with the House GOP over a potential government shutdown and raising the nation’s debt limit, confident they will win showdowns on both issues. [[WATCH VIDEO](http://thehill.com/video/senate/322259-house-gop-prepares-for-last-fight-against-obamacare)]  Some House Republicans want to bundle the question of setting federal funding levels and raising the debt limit into one vote but a senior Senate Democrat has rejected that possibility. ¶ Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said repeatedly raising the debt limit in small increments wreaks havoc on government operations.¶ “The longer you extend the debt limit, the more thoughtless it is,” he said.¶ Durbin predicted Congress would tackle the debt limit question in mid October instead of pushing the debate until shortly before Christmas.¶ “October 15, mark your calendar,” he said. “I’m told that come October 15 we better start getting serious about it.”¶ Durbin said he wants extend the nation’s borrowing limit for as long as possible in one increment. He cited a year as a reasonable extension.¶ “We’re not going to be in the situation where you’re lurching from crisis to crisis and putting the full faith and credit [of the government] at the hands of a Republican caucus that can’t get it’s act together,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide. “Doing a longer term clean debt-limit extension will prevent that from happening.” Some House Republicans want to maximize their leverage by bundling the debt limit and stopgap measure funding government. They could accomplish this by extending government funding until mid-December and bumping up the debt limit just enough to delay a medium-term solution until year’s end.¶ Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.  “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶

#### -- Republicans will cave now

The Economist 9/21/13 (Print Edition of the Economist, "Once More to the Brink")

Strangely, the improving economics of the debt have done little for the rotten politics. Both the president and Republican leaders in Congress are anxious to avoid a repeat of their standoff in August 2011, when they brought America close to an unnecessary and catastrophic default by refusing to agree on the terms under which the debt ceiling should be raised.¶ In this section¶ [Style and substance](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586553-it-may-not-look-it-barack-obamas-presidency-tied-syria-style-and-substance)¶ Once more to the brink¶ [Tokers’ delight](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586584-sensible-drug-policy-decision-federal-government-once-tokers-delight)¶ [Mass shootings are up; gun murders down](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586585-mass-shootings-are-up-gun-murders-down)¶ [Of trolls and mistrials](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586543-idiotic-comments-derail-big-civil-rights-case-trolls-and-mistrials)¶ [The risk of rabid raccoons](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586542-using-marshmallow-treats-fight-deadly-disease-risk-rabid-raccoons)¶ [The American Dream, RIP?](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586581-economist-asks-provocative-questions-about-future-social-mobility-american)¶ [Reprints](http://www.economist.com/rights)¶ The “debt ceiling” is the legal limit to federal borrowing. Since the Treasury borrows 19 cents of every dollar it spends, Congress has to keep raising the debt ceiling or Uncle Sam will not be able to pay his bills. When Republicans and Democrats played chicken with the full faith and credit of the United States, it undermined confidence in the economy and dented the squabbling lawmakers’ approval ratings. Yet they seem poised to do it all again.¶ On October 1st much of the federal government will shut down unless Congress votes to fund the roughly 35% of the budget that requires annual authorisation. Then, around mid-October, the Treasury will hit the debt ceiling. Unless Congress votes to raise it, Treasury will have to stop paying bills such as salaries, pensions, and in the extreme, interest on the national debt, which would trigger a cataclysmic default.¶ In theory, a deal should be within grasp. Mr Obama would like to replace the so-called “sequester”—across-the-board spending cuts that resulted from that last showdown, in 2011—with more targeted spending cuts and higher taxes. But with no leverage to force the Republicans to agree, he would almost certainly sign a budget that kept funding at the sequester’s levels. He also wants the debt ceiling raised with no strings attached. Since Republicans did that last January, they should be prepared to do so again.¶ But several dozen conservative Republican congressmen are blocking the way. They want to use the budget and the debt ceiling to gut Mr Obama’s healthcare plan, the main provisions of which are scheduled to take effect by January. So far, 74 of the 233 House Republicans have sponsored a bill that would wipe out any funds for implementing Obamacare next year, while funding the rest of the government.¶ Mr Obama, however, has vowed not to delay Obamacare or negotiate over the debt ceiling. This has saddled Republican leaders with a dilemma: how to satisfy their members’ Quixotic longing to kill Obamacare without committing political suicide by shutting down the government or causing a default. Last week John Boehner, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Eric Cantor, the Majority Leader, proposed passing two bills, one that defunded Obamacare, and another that funded the government. The Senate could reject the first and pass the second.

#### Winners lose specifically for Obama’s second term

Walsh 12 Ken covers the White House and politics for U.S. News. “Setting Clear Priorities Will Be Key for Obama,” 12/20, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/Ken-Walshs-Washington/2012/12/20/setting-clear-priorities-will-be-key-for-obama

And there is an axiom in Washington: Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and other power centers can do justice to only one or two issues at a time. Phil Schiliro, Obama's former liaison to Congress, said Obama has "always had a personal commitment" to gun control, for example.¶ But Schiliro told the New York Times, "Given the crisis he faced when he first took office, there's only so much capacity in the system to move his agenda." So Obama might be wise to limit his goals now and avoid overburdening the system, or he could face major setbacks that would limit his power and credibility for the remainder of his presidency.

#### Link outweighs on timeframe — replenishment takes too long

Lashof 10 Director of the Climate Center at NRDC (Dan, “Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail”, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda\_shoulda\_woulda\_lessons.html)

Lesson 2: Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource. Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital and created the Tea Party movement. Public support for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital in time to help push climate legislation across the finish line.

#### Capital is finite — fights on one issue makes pushing others harder

Hayward 12 John is a writer at Human Events. “DON’T BE GLAD THE BUFFETT RULE IS DEAD, BE ANGRY IT EVER EXISTED,” 4/17, <http://www.humanevents.com/2012/04/17/dont-be-glad-the-buffett-rule-is-dead-be-angry-it-ever-existed/>

Toomey makes the excellent point that Obama’s class-warfare sideshow act is worse than useless, because it’s wasting America’s valuable time, even as the last fiscal sand runs through our hourglass. Politicians speak of “political capital” in selfish terms, as a pile of chips each party hoards on its side of the poker table, but in truth America has only a finite amount of political capital in total. When time and energy is wasted on pointless distractions, the capital expended — in the form of the public’s attention, and the debates they hold among themselves — cannot easily be regained. ¶ There is an “opportunity cost” associated with the debates we aren’t having, and the valid ideas we’re not considering, when our time is wasted upon nonsense that is useful only to political re-election campaigns. Health care reform is the paramount example of our time, as countless real, workable market-based reforms were obscured by the flaccid bulk of ObamaCare. The Buffett Rule, like all talk of tax increases in the shadow of outrageous government spending, likewise distracts us from the real issues.

#### Debates about NFU will succumb to partisan infighting and cost political capital

Rubner 00 (Michael, Prof @ James Madison College @ Michigan State University, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Post Cold War Era” 9 MSU-DCL J. Int’l L. 271, Lexis)

Numerous proposals have been brought forth to align America's nuclear weapons policy with the new political realities of the post Cold War era. These include adopting a "no-first-use" posture, reducing the arsenal well below the numerical levels envisioned for START III, abandoning the quest for a nation-wide missile defense system, eliminating the land-based leg of the strategic triad, destroying the  [\*280]  arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, decoupling warheads from missiles, and partially dismantling missiles. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.121464.41170621358&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1254181627234&returnToKey=20_T7450986233&parent=docview" \l "n31) There are several reasons why most of these recommended changes are not likely to be adopted in the near future. First, as clearly demonstrated by the fierce debates over the 1993-94 Nuclear Posture Review and the Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, there are deeply entrenched bureaucratic interests that have a vested interest in the status quo and thus resist significant change. Second, contrary to the claims of the advocates for change, it is not at all self-evident that their proposals will necessarily accomplish those goals which they value and hope to achieve. For example, it is not at all clear whether radical reductions of nuclear warheads to levels well below 500 or even 100 per side will enhance or endanger stable deterrence between the U.S. and Russia. Likewise, there are strong disagreements among and between academics and government officials regarding the likely impact on stable deterrence and nonproliferation of such policies as "no-first-use," negative security assurances to nonnuclear states, lowering the alert rates of strategic nuclear forces, adopting complete bans on the testing of nuclear weapons and deploying a nation-wide ABM system. The sad fact remains that more than five decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we still know little about those factors that lead to and detract from stable deterrence and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Third, as we are clearly reminded by the Senate's rejection of the CTBT and the Congressional push for an NMD system, the legislative branch has at least some say in determining a portion of this country's nuclear weapons policy. In these two instances, Congress was either able to veto a reform favored by liberals (the CTBT) or to lend support to a policy favored by conservatives (the NMD).Lastly, with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S. as the unrivaled superpower, the broad bipartisan consensus that helped to shape this country's nuclear weapons policy has evaporated as well. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the CTBT fell victim to unabashed and blatant partisan politics, and that President Clinton succumbed to Republican pressures with his decision to sign the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 in order to deprive the GOP of a  [\*281]  potentially damaging campaign issue. With the growing intrusion of partisan and electoral politics into the policy making process, there is less likelihood that America's nuclear posture will change either quickly or substantially.

#### Military Industrial Complex would oppose NFU. Sunk costs in nuclear weapons make them highly profitable.

**Guangqian and Yu 2009**

Peng **Guangqian** editor-in-chief of Strategic Sciences and has long been engaged in research on military strategy and international affairs **AND** Rong **Yu** is a Ph. D. candidate at the Institute of International Strategy and Development, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua Uni­versity. **2009** China Security, Vol. 5 No. 1 Winter 2009, pp. 78-87 www.washingtonobserver.org/pdfs/Peng\_and\_Rong.pdf

Therefore, for states that possess large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and have established nuclear doctrines and postures tailored for first use of nuclear weapons, the cost invested may be highly prohibitive to considering alternative poli­cies. A credible NFU pledge would require such states to make substantial changes to their first-use oriented arsenals, delegation of authority and force deployment. As a domestic player, **the military-industrial complex** involved in the development and production of nuclear weapons would be opposed to any decline in the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy and would form an obstacle to NFU policy.

#### Nuclear parity with China massively unpopular – policy limitations key link

**Saunders ‘9** (Philip C., Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Managing Strategic Competition with China, Strategic Forum, No. 242, July)

The dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition in areas such as nuclear modernization, ballistic missile defense, space and counterspace capabilities, and cyber warfare will inevitably have some impact on the broader bilateral relationship. Given ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and competing demands on scarce defense resources, many in the U.S. nuclear, missile defense, space, cyber, and conventional force communities are likely to be frustrated at resource, technology, and policy limitations that restrict development and procurement of some advanced U.S. capabilities. These military communities will focus intently on Chinese research and development, procurement, and deployments in their respective areas, and seek to mobilize leadership attention and resources on their missions and concerns. Their Chinese counterparts will do the same. If U.S. efforts do not produce clear continued dominance (the likely outcome, given political and budget constraints), political controversy will soon follow. At the very least, the likelihood of continuing U.S.-China strategic competition suggests that nuclear, missile defense, space, and cyber issues will be irritants (and potentially destabilizing factors) in bilateral relations for some time to come.

#### NFU produces a political firestorm and trades off with more effective arms control efforts.

Morton H. **Halperin**, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and Senior Advisor to the Open Society Institute, worked on nuclear issues in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administrations in the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the State Department, 10-1-**09**, Promises and Priorities, Survival,51:5,17 — 46, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/370333\_731089797\_915329759.pdf

Sagan and I agree that there is a clear response to this argument: the threat to use nuclear weapons in these situations is not credible and the implication that nuclear weapons are necessary reduces the credibility of the conventional deterrent. This response, however, does not deal with the very serious domestic political storm a president would confront, even today, were he to make such a promise. Such a storm would result from a very different view of nuclear weapons held by many who are deeply sceptical that stigmatising nuclear weapons will prevent their further proliferation. Opponents of no first use, including many associated with Democratic presidents, believe that such a no-first use promise will increase the political cost of using nuclear weapons only for the United States, undermining the credibility of the US deterrent, and especially the extended deterrent. There is no doubt that some allies would be nervous if the United States made a no-first-use pledge even after extended consultations. Such discussions, as Sagan notes, would be necessary especially with NATO allies and Japan. Critics are not likely to feel that influencing Indian nuclear doctrine, as Sagan discusses, is sufficiently important to overcome their objections, particularly given the importance that they attach to extended deterrence. Obama has stated that he believes it is in the American interest to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Indeed, his commitment to seek a world free of nuclear weapons carries the clear implication that we can meet all of our security challenges, short of nuclear threats, without reliance on nuclear weapons. However, there are other proposals to pursue this objective which would be as effective as a declaratory no-first-use policy and which might produce less controversy. In his Prague speech, in addition to announcing support for the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, Obama committed himself in the short run to four other measures which have long been debated and which advance the same objectives as the no-first-use proposal. These are: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, immediately and aggressively pursuing US ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and starting negotiations on a verifiable end to the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This ambitious agenda will require all the attention and political capital the president can reasonably devote to this issue. Under the circumstances, no first use can and should be put off for another day. Seeking three treaties on nuclear arms control in his first term will not be easy. The Senate looks ready to ratify the new START and the proposal for a ban on fissile-material production for weapons purposes has not engendered much opposition as of yet. The CTBT, however, is another story. Republican orthodoxy on nuclear weapons emphasises unequivocal support for ballistic- missile defence and virulent opposition to no first use and the test ban. The opposition to both stems from the same source. Opponents of the treaty seek new nuclear weapons with new capabilities for a variety of pre-emptive and preventive purposes. They worry about the Russian development of new nuclear weapons and argue that the Kremlin has a different view of what is prohibited under the treaty and will, in any case, cheat. They doubt that US ratification of the CTBT will help prevent proliferation. Winning the CTBT debate and ultimately gaining the 67 votes in the Senate necessary to permit US ratification of the treaty is far from assured, but it is possible. The president is committed to the CTBT and not yet to no first use. In any case, I would argue that ratification of the CTBT and a vigorous effort to secure the other ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into force is the more important, and promising, effort to stigmatise nuclear weapons.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the economy –

McAuliff 9/18/13 (Michael, Covers Congress for the Huffington Post, "Debt Limit Showdown Could be Catastrophic For Economy: Analysts")

Much like Democrats who released [their own report on the topic](http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f1f34dc1-775b-4bc5-b1a1-739e963f0277), Zandi noted, however, that in the last showdown over the debt ceiling two years ago, the U.S. government's credit rating was downgraded and the stock market tanked.¶ "You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.¶ He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.¶ "If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."¶ "We'll be in the middle of a very, very severe recession, and I don't see how we get out of it," he added.